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victions, be they religiously, morally, or philosophically inspired
should be given the same weight by Congress and the courts in
determining who may be excused from participating in a war.
Richard D. Pompelio
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-ANCILLARY JUEISDIC£oN-THmID-
P~AT' D ENDAmA's CouNmv cunm AGAINST PLAnnF wnTHOUT AN
INDEPENDENT BASIs OF FEDmrAL JUmIsDIcrION-In an action brought in
United States district court for breach of contract, negligence and
misrepresentation with respect to two construction contracts, movant
Revere Copper and Brass, Incorporated [hereinafter Revere] sued
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company [hereinafter Aetna] as surety on
performance bonds it executed on the two contracts for George A.
Fuller Company [hereinafter Fuller]. Fuller had agreed to indemnify
Aetna for all losses it sustained on the bonds. Aetna, therefore,
impleaded1 Fuller as a third-party defendant under Rule 14(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Fuller counterclaimed under
Rule 14(a)3 alleging breach of warranty, negligence, wanton and will-
fil misconduct, and misrepresentation on Revere's part. Both Revere
1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 allowing impleader does not establish
a right of reimbursement indemnity, nor contribution; but where there is
a basis for such right Rule 14 expedites the presentation and in some
cases accelerated the accrual of such right. 3 J. Moore, FDEDAL PRA CCE
[hereinafter cited as MooRE]
1403 (2d ed. 1968). See also. C. W EcHr, LAw OF FEDERAL CouNTs
[hereinafter cited as WriGH] § 76 (2d ed. 1970).
2 Rule 14. Third-Party Practice.
(a) WHEN DEFENDANT MAY Busc IN THRD PARTY.
At any time after commencement of the action defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.... The person served
with the summons and third- party complaints, hereinafter called third-
party defendant, shall make-his defenses to the third-party plaintiff's
claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party
plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided
in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may also assert anti claim against
the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
jec mttr o te laitif' climagins te hir-prt plinif. Theplaintif may assert -any claim against the third-party defendant arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of theplaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party de-
fendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and hiscounterclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. Any party may
move to strike the third-party claim, or for its severance or separate trial.
.. FED. R. Ciy. P. 14(a) (emphasis added).
3 This counterclaim under Rule 14(a) is not a true counterclaim since the
parties are not "opposing" prior to its service. MOORE II 14.17.
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and Fuller were incorporated in Maryland; therefore, Revere moved to
dismiss Fullers counterclaim alleging it was not supported by an
independent ground of federal jurisdiction.4 The district court denied
Revere's motion; consequently, Revere brought this interlocutory
appeal.5 Held: Affirmed. A third-party defendant's counterclaim
under Rule 14(a) against the original plaintiff comes within the
ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts. Revere Copper and Brass
Incorporated v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 426 F.2d 709
(5th Cir. 1970).
Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
third-party practice, or impleader, a procedural device whereby a
party to an action, because of a claim asserted against him in the
original action, may bring in an additional party and claim against
such third party. This device is made available to avoid circuitry of
action, multiplicity of suits, and inconsistent results, by settling, as far
as possible, related matters in one litigation.( To adequately protect
the impleaded party, or third-party defendant, the Rule provides that
he may assert his full defenses and/or counterclaims.
In order to give full usefulness to those rules7 designed to determine
in action the various claims arising from the same transaction or
occurrence,8 the federal courts have retained jurisdiction over claims
428 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964) requires, inter alia, that for the district courts to
have original jurisdiction over civil actions not otherwise based on a federal
question that it be between "( 1) citizens of different states".
528 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958):
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not other-
,wise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order
if application is made to it with 10 days after entry of the order: Provided
however, that application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceed-
ings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals
or a judge thereof shall so order.6 Wiggins v. Philadelphia, 331 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1964); Lesnick v. Pub.
Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d968 (2d Cir. 1944); 1A W. BAmmoN & A. HoLT'zoFF,
FEDRAL. PAcnrcE AND PRocEDrR [hereinafter cited as BaBRoN & HOLTZHOFF]
§ 421 (Wright rev. 1960); MooRE 11 14.04; Wpamcrr § 76; Fraser, Ancillary Juris-
diction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1964);
Holtzhoff, Entry of Additional Parties in a Civil Action Intervention and Third-
Party Practice, 31 F.R.D. 101 (1963); Note, Diversity Requirements in Multi-
Party Litigation 58 CoLum. L. REv. 548 (1958); Note, The Ancillary Concept
and the Federal Rules, 64 HAIv. L. RE:. 968 (1951); Note, Third-Party Practice
-Impleader, 40 Ky. L.J. 88 (1950); Comment, 11 OxK.A. L. REv. 326 (1958).7 Rules 13, 14 and 24. See Lesnick v. Pub. Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968
(2d Cir. 1944); 64 HAzv. L. REv., supra note 6.
8 Lesnick v. Pub. Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944); Note,
Ancillary jurisdiction-Rule 14, 51 Nw. L. RE:. 354 (1956). Contra, Note, Five
Years of Third-Party Practice, 29 VA. L. REv. 981 (1943).
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which otherwise lack independent grounds for federal jurisdiction.
Such claims are held ancillary9 to the main action, and therefore,
supported by its grounds for federal jurisdiction.10 The instant case
is the first appellate decision involving the question of whether a
third-party defendant needs independent jurisdictional grounds to
support a counterclaim against the original plaintiff. Six district
court cases have dealt with the issue, but their decisions are divided.
In Morris, Wheeler and Company, Incorporated v. Rust Engineer-
ing Company,' the District Court for Delaware held in 1945 that it
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the counterclaim brought by the
third-party defendant against the plaintiff because both were Pennsyl-
vania corporations. The court analogized this situation to one where
the plaintiff amends his complaint to include the third-party de-
fendant, an action that already had been held to require independent
federal jurisdiction.' 2 The court clearly refused to hold that this type
9 The concept of ancillary jurisdiction was established in federal courts long
before the promgation of the federal rules. Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970). If a claim is found to be
ancillary or "logically related" to the main suit the jurisdictional requirements may
be disregarded:
A federal court has ancillary jurisdiction of the subject matter of a
counterclaim if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of an opposing party's claim of which the court has juris-
diction. Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d
631, 633 (3d Cir. 1961).
See also Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); BAmoN & HoLTZaoFr
§ 424; Wright § 76; Fraser, supra note 6; Comment, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 1513
(1962).
1oThe doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, however, appears to be in a
metamorphosis, from which it will emerge a greater thing. Courts have
held that a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction as the plain-
tiff's claim need not have independent jurisdiction, since the counterclaim
is ancillary to the plaintiff's claim. In such a case, additional parties, who
are only severally liable, may be brought in on the counterclaim regardless
of ensuing lack of diversity. A cross claim arising out of the same subject
matter as the original action is ancillary and requires no independent
jurisdictional basis, even though permissive. In an interpleader action
based upon diversity between the stakeholder and the two claimants
(both of identical citizenship), the court may retain jurisdiction of the
controversy between the claimants after the stakeholder has dropped out
of the action because the dispute between the claimants is ancillary to
the main action. Intervention of right also is uniformly permitted without
regard to citizenship of the intervenor on the ground of ancillary juris-
diction; and this principle has been extended even to permissive inter-
vention. Intervention has even been permitted without regard to citizen-
ship in a spurious class action. From these illustrations it is clear that
ancillary jurisdiction is expanding and is sufficiently broad to permit a
third-party defendant to assert a claim against the plaintiff. Comment, 11
Oi:r A. L. REv. 326, 329-30, (1958).
114 F.R.D. 307 (D. Del. 1945). Note that this was prior to the 1946
amendment to Rule 14 which specificaly provided for a third-party defendants
counterclaim. In this case, the third-party defendants countercli was brought
under Rule 13.
1 Friend v. Mid-Atlantic Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1946); MoonE
(Continued on next page)
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of claim came within the court's ancillary jurisdiction. The court also
relied on the express prohibition of Rule 82 against expanding federal
jurisdiction through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3
The District Court for the Southern District of New York did not
agree with the Morris case. Instead, in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederland-
sche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschapp,14 the court held that the
third-party defendant's counterclaim "clearly arose out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintffs claim
against the third-party plaintiff."15 The counterclaim, because it ful-
filled this requirement, was allowed despite the fact that the original
plaintiff and third-party defendant were citizens of the same state.
The court also noted that the original third-party claim was ancillary.
The controversy gathered momentum, when in 1953 in Shverha v.
Maryland Casualty Company,16 the District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania dismissed a third-party defendant's counterclaim
against a fellow citizen of Pennsylvania for lack of federal jurisdiction.
The court, adopting the rationale of Professor Moore, drew the analogy
similarly made in the Morris case:
Since as we have seen, the plaintiff may avail himself of this pro-
cedural right only where there is an independent jurisdictional
ground to support his claim against the third party, it must follow
that if the third party takes the initiative to assert a claim against
the plaintiff there must be independent jurisdictional grounds in
support thereof.
17
To further complicate matters, in 1959 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York in James King and Son v. Indemnity
Insurance Company of North America' s ignored its earlier decision in
Bernstein and adopted Shverha; thereby dismissing the third-party
defendant's counterclaim against a fellow citizen of New York for the
lack of independent jurisdictional grounds. The third-party defendants
in this case tried to assert that, since their counterclaim was by defini-
tion compulsory, they would be barred from ever raising the claim
again. The court held that, because it lacked jurisdiction over the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
tf 14.27; Note, Diversity Requirements in Multi-Party Litigation, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 548 (1958); Comment, 11 OxLA. L. REv. 326 (1958). Contra, Fraser, supra
note 6; Holtzhoff, supra note 6.
13 Rule 82. Jurisdiction and Venue Unaffected. These rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district
courts .... FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
14 9 F.R.D. 557 (SDNY 1949).
15 Id. at 558.
16 110 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
17 Id. at 175.
18 178 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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claim, its dismissal thereof would be without prejudice. Also a factor
in the decision was that the court seemed disinclined to provide the
third-party defendants
* . . with a right which they could not enjoy in a New York court,
where a third-party defendant may not counterclaim against the
original plaintiff unless the plaintiff amends his complaint to in-
clude direct claims against the third-party defendant.19
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1962
also changed its mind. In Heintz and Company v. Provident Trades-
man Bank and Trust Company,20 the court expressly rejected Shverha
and refused to dismiss a third-party defendant's counterclaim because
it lacked the requisite federal jurisdictional amount. This court's
rationale was based on the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. Equating
the criteria for a Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaim21 with that of
the third-party defendant's counterclaim, the court felt that, since the
Rule 13(a) counterclaim was by definition ancillary,22 and, therefore,
required no independent grounds of jurisdiction, neither should the
third-party defendant's counterclaim. The possibility of collusion
which had operated to keep a plaintiff's claim against a third-party
defendant from being declared ancillary was held by the court to be
remote here since the third-party defendant is an involuntary party
to the action.
The latest district court case to consider the issue is Union Bank
and Trust Company v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company.
23
In this case, the District Court for Nebraska in 1965 dismissed the
motion to strike the third-party defendant's counterclaim for lack of
independent jurisdictional grounds. This court, like the court in
Heintz, felt that the third-party defendant's counterclaim was cer-
tainly within the scope of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
In the Revere case, the Court of Appeals makes a survey of the
preceding cases as well as the treatises and current legal literature.24
19 Id. at 148. This is contrary to the rights of a third party under Federal
Rule 14(a).
2030 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
21 Rule 13. Counterclaim and Cross-Claim
(a) ColmuisoRY CouNrsicLmnvss. A pleading shall state as a counter-
claim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader
has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.... FED. R. C1. P. 13 (a).
22 See note 9 supra.
2338 F.R.D. 486 (D. Neb. 1965).
24 426 F.2d at 711 n.4.
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Its decision centered on the applicability of the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction to third-party defendant counterclaims. Most helpful
to the court was the application of the doctrine to other multiple
party dilemmas,25 especially intervention under Rule 24(a) .26 The
Court felt that Fuller could have intervened into this action, as well
as having been brought in as a third-party defendant.2  Consequently,
since an intervenor of right has been held to be able to counterclaim
against the original plaintiff without an independent basis of federal
jurisdiction,
[i]t would be anomalous to hold that Fuller could have asserted its
counterclaim against Revere free of any jurisdictional impediment
if it had taken the initiative of intervening, and yet hold that since
Fuller was brought into this action involuntarily as a third-party
defendant, its counterclaim must satisfy the requirements of strict
diversity and thus fail.28
In adopting this analogy between Fuller as a third-party defendant
and an intervenor, the court rejected the argument restricting the
third-party defendant's claims against the plaintiff because they are
analogous to those of the original plaintiff against the third-party
defendant. The court held the situations converse because the plaintiff
was a voluntary party29 to the action while a third-party defendant
was not. This, asserted the court, was important in strictly applying
ancillary jurisdiction where the possibility of collusion or fortuitous
circumvention of the jurisdictional requirements exist. In emphasizing
this difference, the court made it clear that the plaintiff must have
independent jurisdictional grounds for any claim he asserts against
the third-party defendant despite its holding in the instant case.
The last hurdle the court met was that of Rule 82 and the general
25 See note 10 supra.
20 Rule 24. Intervention.
(a) INTERVE TON oF RiGar. Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action (1) when a statute of the United
States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately repre-
sented by existing parties. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
27 Intervention is permitted as a matter of right under FED. R. Crv. P.
24 despite an absence of requisite jurisdiction over the intervenor's claim
if it can be shown that his interests are not sufficiently represented, or
that he may be barred from bringing a subsequent action, or otherwise
be deprived of an adequate remedy. Comment, 8 UTAu L. Bxv. 145,
147 n.14 (1964).
Cf. Northeast Clackamas County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Cont. Cas. Co., 221 F.2d
329 (9th Cir. 1955).
28 426 F.2d at 716.
29 Accord, Fraser, supra note 6; 58 CoLum. L. FEv., supra note 6.
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trend to restrict federal jurisdiction.30 The court did not feel that its
decision to allow the counterclaim broadened the scope of ancillary
jurisdiction. Instead, by applying the doctrine to the third-party
counterclaim it provided "opportunities for involving the doctrine,
which, as has been seen, was already well established when the rules
became effective, in additional situations."3' In summary, the Court
argued that jurisdiction is not extended by mere devices making
possible more complete adjudication of issues in a single case. The
court maintained its decision was based upon jurisdictional principles
of long standing, even though the effectiveness of the new devices
makes their use more frequent.
The merits of this decision hinge on the validity of its application
of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to the third-party defendant's
counterclaim. The previous cases to the contrary had not so applied
the doctrine because (1) the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
defendant is not within the doctrine and (2) Rule 82 expressly prohibits
the Federal Rules from expanding federal jurisdiction.
The policy behind the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction and Rule
14 is the same.32 The requirements for a third-party counterclaim
and those of ancillary claims are the same.38 Consequently, the parties
and issues involved in the counterclaim are already before the court
because of the original action. It would seem, therefore, the court's
decision to apply the doctrine in this case would logically follow. The
fact that as an intervenor Fuller could have asserted his counterclaim
without challenge further cements this logic.3 4
Plaintif's claims against third-party defendants are generally
required to have independent jurisdiction to "prevent possible cir-
cumvention of the diversity of citizenship requirement through
collusion between a plaintiff and friendly defendant." 5 Professor
Moore, the proponent for dismissing third-party defendant's claims,
asserts that because the counterclaim is brought on the third-party
defendant's "initiative"36 it should be dismissed unless supported by
30 1 Mooan ff 0.71; 32 Am. Jun. 2d Federal Practice and Procedure § 76
(1967). Cf. Marbury, Why Should We Limit Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.P,
46 A.B.A.J. 379 (1960); Meador, A New Approach to Limiting Diversity Juris-
diction, 46 A.B.A.J. 383 (1960); 64 H.Anv. L. REV., supra note 6.
31426 F.2d at 717.
32 Supra note 6, and accompanying text.
33 See notes 2 and 9 supra.
34 426 F.2d at 716.
35 Comment, 8 UTAH L. REv. 145, 148 (1962).
36 Nor are we troubled by the fact that the third-party defendant has
taken the 'initiative to assert a claim against plaintiff... .' An intervenor
under Rule 24(b) has quite clearly initiated litigation and yet intervention
needs no independent jurisdictional grounds. Heintz and Co. v. Provident
Trade, sans Bank and Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171, 174 (E.D. Pern. 1962).
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independent grounds of jurisdiction. This argument not only ignores
the other instances in which ancillary jurisdiction has saved auxiliary
claims but it also ignores the fact that as to collusion (the raison dretre
of the authority against ancillary jurisdiction for claims of plaintifFs
against third-party defendants),
... a third-party defendant cannot assert a claim unless the plain-
tiff has first instituted an action. Even then, unless the third-party
defendant has some control over the defendant, he cannot be
assured of being impleaded. Thus it is highly improbable that a
third-party defendant could collude to avoid the jurisdictional re-
quirements.3 7
Also, the plaintiff by bringing the action in federal court, submitted
himself to all claims arising out of the transaction which is the subject
matter of the litigation.
The court, by holding that the third-party defendant's counterclaim
is within its ancillary jurisdiction, did not extend jurisdiction in con-
travention of Rule 82:
While Rule 82 provides that the other rules shall not be construed
to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Federal courts . . . , it
was not felt [by commentators on the Federal Rules] that the ex-
tension of recognized concepts of ancillary jurisdiction to practice
under Rule 14 did any violence to this limitation.3 8
The accomplishment of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction may be
thus discrediting, but that may be remedied by Congress or the courts
themselves. It seems obvious that the third-party defendant's counter-
claim is within the recognized doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
The third-party defendant's counterclaim was rightfully held to be
within the district court's jurisdiction. This protects Fuller from pos-
sible inconsistent results of two trials based on what would have to be
similar facts. In a time of crowded court dockets the holding also
seems to be in accord with the purpose of the Federal Rules to
"secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."39
It does not seem that hearing Fullers counterclaim would have
increased the burden on the court nor frustrated the purpose for
imposing jurisdictional requirements. To the extent that there is any
prejudice or hardship worked on the plaintiff by his having to
defend against the counterclaim, his remedy is adequately provided
37 8 UTAH L. REv., supra, note 27, at 147.
38 29 VA. L. REv., supra note 8 at 998.
39 FEP. R. Civ. P. 1.
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for in Rule 42(b) which provides the trial court with broad discretion
to grant separate trials.
4 0
W. Stokes Harris, Jr.
MIpEACHM NT OF Wrnmss CEDiBn Y By USE OF PAST CONVICrMON
EVImNcE-KENTUCKY COuRT OF APPEALS ADOPTS A NEW RuLE.-Over
seventy years ago James Thayer laid the foundation for the modem
trends in evidence law. Thayer proposed that "unless excluded by
some rule or principle of law, all that is logically probative is admis-
sible."1 Since that time, courts have moved steadily toward an open
door policy of admissibility, closing that door only when confronted
with irrelevant or prejudicial material.2 The effect of this liberalization
of admissibility has been to place a greater burden on the trial judge
to define relevancy and to instruct on the weight of evidence, and a
greater burden on the whole system to assure witness credibility.
Most crucial to our judicial system is the assumption that judges
and juries can believe what witnesses say. To assure this critical
element of credibility, a number of devices have evolved within the
judicial system.3 The most effective of these is the operation of cross-
examination as a part of the advocacy tradition.4 Cross-examination is
particularily suited for credibility testing since it inevitably probes the
weaknesses and inconsistencies in the fabric of testimony. It is this
effectiveness as a credibility test which partially accounts for the
trend toward liberality in the scope of cross-examination.5
The most serious test of witness credibility occurs when cross-
examination is used as a vehicle for impeachment. As the Thayer-
initiated trend toward greater admissibility has spread, the methods
4o Rule 42. Consolidation; Separate Trials
(b) Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition
and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counter-
claim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of
claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims or issues, always
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United
States.
I J. THmA, PREInvnNAny TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 265 (1898).
2 See Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 167
(1940).
3 The most obvious of these is the requirement that witnesses be sworn to
tell the truth and the development of sanctions to be applied in the event of
perjury. For a discussion of other credibility tests, see Ladd, supra note 2, at
167-71.
4 Ladd, supra note 2, at 167-71.
rid.
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